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In the past, the federal government has intro-
duced moral hazard in the banking system
through deposit insurance. Banks underpriced
risk because of the federal guarantee that backed
deposits. After banking crises in the 1980s and
1990s, deposit insurance was put on a sound
basis and that source of moral hazard was miti-
gated. In its place, monetary policy has become
a source of moral hazard. In acting to counter
the economic effects of declining asset prices,
the Federal Reserve has come to be viewed as
underwriting risky investments. Policy pro-
nouncements by senior Fed officials have rein-
forced that perception. These actions and pro-
nouncements are mutually reinforcing and
destructive to the operation of financial mar-
kets. The current financial crisis began in the
subprime housing market and then spread
throughout credit markets. The new Fed policy
fueled the housing boom. Refusing to accept
responsibility for the housing bubble, the Fed’s
recent actions will likely fuel a new asset bubble.
The cumulative effects of recent monetary poli-
cy undermine the case for free markets.
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Introduction
“The Fed . . . is unwittingly contribut-
ing to a form of moral hazard—that it
stands by ready to prop up the market
if it fails, but will do nothing to stop it
going up too high.”1
In recent years, investors have rationally
come to believe that the Federal Reserve will
intervene to prevent or offset the effects of
declining asset prices. That belief was first
summarized in the phrase “the Greenspan
Put,” now the “Bernanke Put.” The current
financial crisis is at least partly the outcome
of this new approach to monetary policy.
Since the1930s the federal governmenthas
insured bank deposits. That scheme inherent-
ly reduced the vigilance of bank depositors
toward their banks, removing constraints on
risk taking by the insured depository institu-
tions. The situationbecame acute in the 1980s
and 1990s, when undeterred risk taking by
banks and thrift institutions led to a series of
financial crises. Eventually the deposit insur-
ance systemwas reformedandbankingputon
a sounder basis. It is time for a similar reform
ofmonetary policy.
The SubprimeMortgage
Crisis
The popular press discovered subprime
mortgage loans when twomajor originators of
such loans, HSBC Holdings PLC and New
CenturyFinancial, disclosed increased loan loss
provisions.HSBC is a globally diversified finan-
cial companyandsurvivedthecrisis intact.New
Century Financial faredmuch less well because
of the concentration of its lending in this risky
category. Its stock price collapsed after prob-
lems surfaced on February 8, 2007, and the
company eventually declared bankruptcy.2
Problems spread to other lenders in the
subprime market. By the end of 2007, more
than 100 mortgage companies had suspend-
ed operations or sought buyers. The spread
between interest rates on subprime loans and
those on safe treasury securities increased
dramatically, indicating rising risk aversion
to that market.3
The carnage continued into 2008 and
eventually claimed investment house Bear
Stearns, bailed out by JP Morgan Chase with
assistance from the Fed and U.S. Treasury.
The U.S. economy experienced a serious
slowdown, as measured by the anemic annu-
alized growth rate for real GDPof 0.6 percent
in the fourth quarter of 2007. That weak rate
of growth was repeated in the first quarter.
Technically, the economy did not fall into
recession.
The seeds of the subprime crisis were sown
years earlier, and the collapse in that submar-
ket of mortgage lending is linked to previous
financial eruptions, such as the high-tech and
telecombust. The subprime collapse spread to
other segments of housing finance. The crisis
in housing finance in turn spread to other
creditmarkets, even to interbank lending. The
financial crisis is the latest in a series of finan-
cial bubbleswhose existence reflects, at least in
part, moral hazard in financial markets.
Moral hazard is the outcome of explicit or
implicit guarantees to investors. At one time,
deposit insurance was amajor culprit. Today,
monetary policy is fostering moral hazard.
Monetary policy can generatemoral hazard if
it is conducted in a manner that bails in-
vestors out of risky and otherwise ill-advised
financial commitments. If investors come to
expect that the policy will persist, then they
will deliberately take on additional risk with-
out demanding commensurately higher
returns for that risk. In effect, they will lend
at the risk-free interest rate on risky projects,
or at least at a lower rate than would other-
wise be the case. Toomuch risky lending and
investment will take place. Capital will have
been misallocated.
Monetary Policy
To simplify a complex theoretical issue, an
ideal monetary policy is one that facilitates
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and does not distort economic decisionmak-
ing. In a market economy, the key decisions
involve allocating resources to their most
valuable use.4Market prices play a critical role
in that process by signaling to everyone the
relative scarcity of goods and urgency of ends.
Friedrich A. Hayek characterized the price
system as a communications mechanism for
transmitting information about economic val-
ues.5 By communicating that valuable infor-
mation, the price system helps coordinate eco-
nomic activities. As with any communication
system, it is desirable to filterout “noise,” extra-
neous signals that interfere with communica-
tion. Money is indispensable to price forma-
tion, butmoney can generate noise along with
information. The ideal monetary policy is one
in which there is no noise, only valid price sig-
nals. The best possible monetary policy would
maximize the signal-to-noise ratio.6
Monetary noise comes about when policy
changes the value ofmoney. In economies on
gold or silver standards, the discovery of new
sources of the precious metal could set in
motion forces leading to an expansion of the
money supply and the depreciation in the
value of money. In modern times money is
created by printing it or through expansion
of the liabilities of banks. In nearly all devel-
oped countries, the rate of that expansion is
(or can be) controlled by central banks.7
Changes in the value ofmoney createmon-
etary noise because investors and ordinary
individuals mistake changes in money prices
for changes in relative prices. For instance,
during inflation prices rise just to reflect the
increase in money and not as the result of any
shift in preferences for goods.8
The best possible monetary policy would
seem to be one in which no change occurred
in the value of the appropriate price index.
The theory supporting a policy of zero or low
price inflation is conventionally termed
“monetarist” and its modern origins go back
to Milton Friedman.9
A number of central banks, such as the
Bank of England and the European Central
Bank have adopted inflation targeting as
official policy. The Fed has not done so offi-
cially. But it has heretofore behaved as if it
has an inflation target, and markets believed
that to be so. The Fed is widely believed to
want inflation to remain under 2 percent—
low but not zero.10
CPI inflation has remained above the Fed’s
notional target for some time. In February
2008, the consumer price index for all urban
consumers (CPI-U) was 4 percent higher than
in February 2007. To put that figure in histor-
ical context, President Richard M. Nixon
decided to impose comprehensive price and
wage controls onAugust 15, 1971, because the
CPI seemed stuck at 4 percent inflation or
higher all that year (having actually hit a 5 per-
cent annual rate the prior year).
Certainly Nixon chose the wrong remedy,
but his intuition that 4 percent inflation was
unacceptably high was on target. Yet why are
most policymakers—as opposed to the pub-
lic—now comfortable with that inflation
rate? What has changed?
Actually nothing has changed for those
who earn, spend, and save dollars. What has
changed is that Fed officials prefer an infla-
tionmeasure excluding foodandenergy (“core
inflation”).11 They have persuaded most pub-
lic officials, but not the public, of the wisdom
of that approach. It is an increasingly unper-
suasive line of argument.
The Fed originally decided to exclude ener-
gy prices because it felt it was unreasonable to
offset OPEC-induced supply shocks. The Fed
wanted an inflation measure that focused on
persistent movements. It did not want to be
forced to offset one-time changes in the price
level, focusing instead on inflation targeting.
By similar logic, the Fed thought it wise to
exclude food prices so as not to take on the
responsibility of offsetting one-time changes
in food prices due to weather shocks.
Whatever the original merits of the Fed’s
approach, the globalization of food trademit-
igates the effects of localized weather events
on food prices. And rising energy prices are
systematically demand-driven outcomes. Core
inflation has become a misleading statistic,
which disconnects policymakers from the
experience of the public.
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Dollar users do not experience core infla-
tion when they make purchases. What ordi-
nary consumers purchase every day is exactly
what is excluded from the core measure. For
consumers, inflation is a tax and the core
measure understates the tax rate.
Despite recent policy missteps, there is no
question that monetary policy is much
improved from the record of the late 1960s,
1970s, and early 1980s. That was the era of
double-digit inflation and sky-high interest
rates. Alan Greenspan has put monetary pol-
icy in historical context:
Although the gold standard could hard-
ly be portrayed as having produced a
period of price tranquility, it was the case
that theprice level in1929wasnotmuch
different, on net, from what it had been
in 1800. But, in the two decades follow-
ing the abandonment of the gold stan-
dard in 1933, the consumer price index
(CPI) in the United States nearly dou-
bled. And, in the four decades after that,
prices quintupled. Monetary policy
unleashed fromthe constraintofdomes-
tic gold convertibility, had allowed a per-
sistent overissuance ofmoney. As recent-
ly as a decade ago, central bankers,
having witnessed more than a half-cen-
tury of chronic inflation, appeared to
confirm that a fiat currency was inher-
ently subject to excess.12
Adding to the problem of conducting
sound monetary policy, some scholars have
suggested that money influences not only
the prices of consumer goods and wages, but
also asset prices. They argue that money can
work itsmischief without showing up in con-
sumer goods inflation. A stable price index of
consumer goods would not be a good mea-
sure of the value of money.13
Money and Prices
What price index should a central bank
stabilize? Should it be consumer prices, a
broadermeasure of prices, nominal wages, or
a measure including asset prices? The choice
of an index will inevitably influence mone-
tary policy. For instance, stabilizing wages
would normally result in price deflation for
consumer goods. There is no uniquely cor-
rectmeasure that corresponds to the theoret-
ical concept of “price stability.”
Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek
argued that stabilizing thepricesof final goods
would not in any case stabilize economic activ-
ity. Hayek argued that in a growing economy,
the monetary policy that would stabilize a
price index of consumer goodswould interfere
with the allocation of resources over time. It
would do so by forcing interest rates below the
level they would otherwise be. The price of
long-livedassets, suchas capital goodsorhous-
ing, moves inversely to movements in the rele-
vant interest rates. Lower interest rates trans-
late into higher asset prices, and vice versa.14
An implication of the Mises-Hayek view is
that stabilizing the prices of final goods and
services will generate asset bubbles. The prices
of long-lived assets can be artificially raised
even though—because—the value of an appro-
priately chosen index of consumer goods is
being stabilized (or there is zero measured
price inflation).
Axel Leijonhufvud has recently presented a
Wicksellian twist on the argument. “The trou-
ble with inflation targeting in present circumstances
is that a constant inflation rate gives you absolutely
no information aboutwhether yourmonetary policy
is right.”15 “Present circumstances” comprise a
globalized economy with cheap imports and
central-bank absorption of excess dollars into
official reserves. Focused on the current infla-
tion rate—employing a measure that underes-
timates that rate, to boot—the Fed believes its
inflation targeting is working and inflation is
“benign.”
Measuring asset-price inflation remains
problematic. Charles Goodhart has argued,
however, that at least one category of assets
looms so large in consumer purchases that it
cannot be ignored: housing. For him, finding
a way to including housing prices in a price
index of consumption is an imperative. In the
4
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United States, the “rental equivalent” of
housing is included in the CPI. But it cannot
serve as a proxy for changes in the prices of
future housing services. Neither conceptual-
ly nor empirically do changes in the prices of
current consumption measure changes in
prices of future consumption. If they did,
there would be no need for futuresmarkets.16
The use solely of current prices for hous-
ing and all other goods and services is inap-
propriate because changes frequently occur
in preferences for future relative to current
consumption. Ideally there would be prices
of future consumption available for every
good, but such is not the case. The inclusion
of asset prices in an index serves as a proxy for
these missing futures prices.
If asset prices are not incorporated into
measures of inflation, their movements will
not be action-forcing events for policymakers.
Fed chairmen will wring their hands about
“irrational exuberance” in suchmarkets butbe
powerless to do anything until the effects of
asset price changes are manifested in undesir-
able changes in current prices and output.17
If Fed officials wait for inflation in asset
prices to translate into inflation in theprices of
current output, they will have permitted not
only a build-up of inflation forces but also
resource misallocation everywhere. Hayek
added a modern twist when he argued that
what we now call “asset bubbles” can actually
raise the Wicksellian natural rate of interest.
That occurs because of capital complementar-
ity. Already completed investments can accord-
ingly raise the return to future investments.18
As expected profits increase, so, too, will
credit demand. The natural rate rises as the
bubble inflates. The central bank finds itself
playing “catch up” andwill often end up rais-
ing rates more than would have otherwise
been the case. After the bubble has burst, the
central bank’s aggressive moves will appear
to have gone “too far.”19
That very much describes what happened
when the subprime bubble finally burst. For
more than a year before the bust, bankers
and regulators knew they had a mess in the
making. As John Makin aptly phrased it, the
lending practices in that market were “shod-
dy and absurd.”20 But inflation was benign.
Likewise, the 1980s real-estate bust in
Texas was widely expected in advance by some
banking regulators and a few good bankers.
Regulators did not act and markets did not
constrain the risky behavior as theoretical
models predict they should.21
These earlier bouts of moral hazard were
the effects of deposit insurance and bank clo-
sure policies that insulated depositors and
even other creditors from risk in the event of
the failure of depository institutions. Ben
Bernanke described the savings and loan cri-
sis of the 1980s as “a situation . . . in which
institutions can directly or indirectly take
speculative positions using funds protected
by the deposit insurance safety net—the clas-
sic ‘heads I win, tails you lose’ situation.”22
After an intellectual and political battle of
more than a decade, the deposit insurance
loophole was sealed.23
The Greenspan Doctrine
Thenewmoral hazard in financialmarkets
has its source in what can be best described as
the Greenspan doctrine. The doctrine was
clearly enunciated in a speech by then Fed
chairman Alan Greenspan on December 19,
2002. Greenspan made an asymmetric argu-
ment leading to an asymmetricmonetary pol-
icy. He argued that asset bubbles cannot be
detected and monetary policy ought not in
any case be used to offset them. The collapse
of bubbles canbedetected, however, andmon-
etary policy ought to be used to offset the fall-
out.24 That position came to be known as the
Greenspan Put, an option to sell depreciated
assets to the Fed.
Two months earlier, then–Fed governor
Ben Bernanke had made a similar argument.
Bernanke’s presentation was more academic
in tone and perhaps more nuanced. Since
Bernanke is now Fed chairman, it is reason-
able for market participants to assume that
the Greenspan doctrine still governs current
Fed policy.
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The two Fed chairmen were surely asking
and answering the wrong question. They
were implicitly treating bubbles as solely the
consequences of real shocks, such as techno-
logical innovation. They asked whethermon-
etary policy should be used to offset the
effects of real shocks and concluded that it
should not. The latter is the correct answer to
the question they each posed.
A different question would be to ask
whether monetary policy should be conduct-
ed so as to create or exacerbate asset bubbles,
whichwouldnothave occurredorwouldhave
been milder absent the assumed monetary
policy. The answer to that question is surely
“no.” Consider Bernanke’s apt characteriza-
tion of moral hazard in the context of the
deposit insurance crisis: “When this moral
hazard is present, credit flows rapidly into
inelastically supplied assets, such as real
estate. Rapid appreciation is the result, until
the inevitable albeit belated regulatory crack-
down stops the flow of credit and leads to an
asset-price crash.”25
Bernanke couldhave been talking about the
subprime mortgage market. That bubble and
collapse cannot be blamed on deposit insur-
ance. First, deposit insurance is no longer sys-
tematicallymispriced, andbanking supervision
has improved. Second, the majority of mort-
gages are no longer made by insured deposito-
ry institutions. Yet something generated the
moral hazard that enabled shoddy underwrit-
ing of subprimemortgages to persist for years.
The Greenspan doctrine made that possi-
ble, or at least facilitated it. The Fed has pre-
announced that it will take no action against
bubbles, but will act aggressively to offset the
consequences of their collapse. In effect, the
central bank is promising at least a partial
bailout of bad investments—insurance with a
deductible. In Greenspan’s own words: mone-
tary policy should “mitigate the fallout [of an
asset bubble] when it occurs and, hopefully,
ease the transition to the next expansion.”26
In the present context, the “next expan-
sion” could also be rendered as “the next asset
bubble.” If the Fed promises to “mitigate the
fallout” from “irrational exuberance,” then it
is rational for investors tobelieve that inherent
risk is being at least partially insured against.
Irrational exuberance becomes rational.
Brian Wesbury, chief economist at First
Trust Advisors, has provided a useful graphic
to depict the roller-coaster ride of monetary
policy over 45 years (see Figure 1). He plotted
the federal funds rate against theaverageannu-
al growth rate in nominalGDPduring the pre-
vious two years. The extreme volatility in the
movement of rates and nominal GDP in the
earlier period has been dampened. Fed policy
continues to involve changing rates too often,
creating the very volatility it seeks todampen.27
The Fed cut the federal funds rate sharply
after the bursting of the stock market bubble
inMarch 2000.28 The Fed cut rates too far and
held them down too long, fueling not only a
vigorous economic expansion but also a hous-
ing bubble. In his December 2002 speech,
Greenspan was at pains to deflect any argu-
ment that theFedwas inflatingahousingbub-
ble. “To be sure,” he acknowledged, mortgage
debt was high relative to household income
(remember the date) by historical norms. But
“low interest rates” were keeping the servicing
requirements of the mortgage debt manage-
able (emphasis added). “Moreover, owing to
continued large gains in residential real estate
values, equity in homes has continued to rise
despite very large debt-financed extractions.”29
How wrong the Fed chairman was! If Alan
Greenspanwasnotworried about interest rates
resetting, however, why should mortgage
bankers andhomeownersworry? Itwouldhave
been reasonable to read into the chairman’s
musings an implicit guarantee of continued
low rates. A homeowner is certainly entitled to
bethishomeon the come ifhewants. It is ques-
tionable, however, whether the central bank
should encourage such behavior.30
Monetary Policy for a
Free Economy
The Federal Reserve confronts a difficult
if not intractable problem: providing a nom-
inal anchor to a dynamic market economy.
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Greenspan suggested at the beginning of his
2002 speech to the Economic Club of New
York that the abandonment of the gold stan-
dard was a watershed event and a fiat curren-
cy is “inherently subject to excess.” He spoke
disapprovingly of a policy that permits prices
to nearly double in two decades. At current
CPI inflation rates, however, prices will dou-
ble in less than two decades.
Greenspan posed a policy dilemma: “Iron-
ically, low inflation, economic stability, and
lowriskpremiumsmayprovide tinder for asset
price speculation that could be sparked should
technological innovationsopenupnewoppor-
tunities for profitable investment.”31 The
dilemma can be recast to remove both irony
and paradox.
In a vibrantmarket economywith techno-
logical innovation and ever newprofit oppor-
tunities, the monetary policy that maintains
price stability in consumer goods (or zero
price inflation) requires substantial mone-
tary stimulus. That stimulus will have a
number of real consequences, including asset
bubbles. These asset bubbles have real costs
and involve misallocations of capital. For
example, by the peak of the tech and telecom
boom in March 2000, too much capital had
been invested in high-tech companies and
too little in “old economy firms.” Too much
fiber optic cable and too fewmiles of railroad
track were laid.
By2002, theFedwasworriedabout thepos-
sibility of price deflation. The experiences of
Japan in the 1990s and the Great Depression
were clearly weighing on the minds of policy-
makers.32 A tilt to stimulus was understand-
able at the time.
A continued bias against deflation will,
however, produce a continued bias upward in
price inflation.With the bursting of each asset
bubble and the fear of deflationary pressure,
Fed policymust ease. The inflation rate begins
at the positive number. The Greenspan doc-
trine prescribes a simulative overkill that
begins the cycle anew. Brian Wesbury’s chart
for 45 years of Fed policy suggests that the
Greenspan doctrine may only have formalized
what was implicit. In any case, the Greenspan-
era gains against inflationwill thenprove to be
only temporary. His doctrine will be the death
of his legacy.
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In theirMonetary History of the United States,
Friedman and Schwartz devoted considerable
attention to the Greenback period, 1867–79.
It was the only period in which two kinds of
money circulated side-by-side at fluctuating
exchange in the United States: gold and
greenbacks. Additionally, the price level fell by
roughly half and “at the same time, economic
growth proceeded at a rapid rate.” As they
noted, the period “casts serious doubts on the
validity of the nowwidely held view that secu-
lar price deflation and rapid economic
growth are incompatible.”33
Friedman and Schwartz clearly distin-
guished the difference betweenmonetary con-
traction and (final goods) price deflation.34
Modern discussions constantly conflate the
two.Monetary contractionproduces recession
or depression, and great monetary contrac-
tions produce great depressions.35
Technological innovation and productivi-
ty growth will, unimpeded, generate secular
deflation. If monetary policy tries to offset
the deflation, confusing it as a sign of mone-
tary tightness, it produces not only asset bub-
bles but also an inflationary bias. Unless the
actual policy tradeoffs are understood, it will
only be by accident that we will get some-
thing approaching the best possible mone-
tary policy. Even conventionally defined price
stability will be an elusive goal.
Current Fed policy has fallen short of pro-
ducing either price stability or zero inflation.
It shoots instead for a stable inflation rate.36
It has failed to achieve even that task.
The failure of inflation targeting to main-
tainmonetary and financial stability is becom-
ing increasingly difficult to ignore. The high-
tech and telecom boom and bust was
accompanied by a stock market boom and
bust, from which we have arguably not fully
recovered.Thatwas followedby thegreathous-
ing boom and bust. All of this took place in
approximately a decade. Analysts are already
speculating on where the next bubble will
inflate.
Many observers would implead financial
liberalization in the policy indictment.37
Financial folly has been a feature, however, of
both highly regulated and largely unregulat-
ed financial systems. The question is whether
the central bank actively underwrites such
folly.
We need not wait for all questions to be
answered toput an end to the inflating, deflat-
ing, and reflating of asset bubbles. Martin
Wolf has reached the correct conclusion when
he called for central banks to “paymore atten-
tion to asset prices in the future. It may be
impossible to identify bubbles with confi-
dence in advance. But central bankers will be
expected to exercise their judgment, both
before and after the fact.”38
That change will move the Fed from the
myth of monetary policy on autopilot and
return the Fed to its old maxim of removing
the punch bowl just when the fun begins. It
will end amonetary policy that equates pros-
perity with a boom-and-bust economy and
wreak financial mayhem on the public.39 It is
a policy that, if continued, will erode the case
for free markets generally.
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